



## A TWIN PREGNANCY: ISLAM AND NATIONALISM IN INDONESIA

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This article offers a critical approach to the discourse of 'Islam Nusantara'. Through a constructivist-interpretivist lens, it provides a historical narrative as the context of the social construction of Indonesian nationalism vis-à-vis 'Indonesian Islam' on the one hand, and 'global Islam' for Indonesians on the other. During the colonial past, the tensions between the colonized and the colonizer in the archipelago were replete with warfare in which the Muslim leaders played critical roles. That memory has helped to shape the relationship between Islam and nationalism, a relationship that complicates the future gravitation in antagonistic directions. On the one hand, toward Indonesian 'nationness', and on the other, toward the unity of the Islamic world when the notion of *Ummah* and the ideal of *khilafah* have become strengthened among a sizeable portion of the Muslim population in the wake of globalization facilitated by information and telecommunication technologies. Thereby, the history set the scene for the gestation of twin 'imagined communities'. One is the 'nationness' of the nationalists, and the other is the 'global *Ummah*' of the Muslims. Contestation between the ideals of the two distinct 'nations' began since the formation of the nation-state and intensified during early independence. At that time, secular-nationalism as a conscious creation of the

modernized educated elite was used as a means of social control in relation to hegemonization and modernization, and was used to unify people from diverse religions and ethnic backgrounds. That secular nationalism was even made 'sacred' in attempts to unify all the nation's potentials toward developmentalists' programs. In more recent times, as Indonesia has entered globalization, that secular-nationalism was reignited once again to respond to the weakening of the 'nation.' On theoretical ground, 'symbolic universe' premise of Berger and Luckmann is propounded to explain the enduring contentions between Muslims and secular nationalists, given the cognitive, normative, and affective components of what have been disputed, namely, religion and nationalism. On the whole, the article aims to be a salutary reminder of the dangers of politicizing 'Islam Nusantara' and making it an 'official Islam' for Indonesian citizen, for it potentially stimulates sectarian clashes within the Muslim society.

**Keywords:** *Historical Narrative, Postcolonial, Developmentalism, Integralism, Islam Nusantara*

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## **Introduction**

**"Symbolic Universes are social products with a history. If one is to understand their meaning, one has to understand the history of their production" (Berger and Luckmann, 1991: 115)**

To describe the two poles of Indonesian Islam, Pringle (2010) uses Traditionalists and Reformists in conformation with terminologies used to outline worldwide Muslim groups. The Traditionalist is the Sufi-influenced Islam, and Reformist, Pringle defined as a "more legalistic style emphasizing the requirements of doctrine as interpreted by the trends in global or transnational Islam of this day" (p.35). Pringle was also

aware that others may use Modernist for what he was calling Reformist because the Reformist movement has been associated with modern schooling with a heavy emphasis on general, academic, non-religious subjects oriented towards a secular professional career. Likewise, Indonesian Muslim, Deliar Noer (1973a, 1973b) also classifies the Indonesian Muslims according to their religious-political attitudes into Traditionalist and Reformist.

Section 2 and 3 show how technology changed the world of Islam. The fortified notion of *Ummah* appeared for the first time on the heels of the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the increasing use of steamship that have facilitated the flow of early Reformist Islam ideas that was followed by the emergence of Reformist-Traditionalist duality in Indonesian Islam. The duality was materialized by the formation of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The two organizations have been the largest mass organizations to this day and have become the mainstream insofar as one can say that every other newer Muslim group must have been founded by the offspring of either one. Therefore, no study of Indonesian Muslim society can be made without beginning with these two essential organisations. Both Muhammadiyah and NU are active in the building of civil society. The community of NU, known as the Nahdliyyin, has been the largest population and represents the Traditionalist Islam. The community of Muhammadiyah represents the early generation of Reformist Islam. Muhammadiyah was associated with modernization of the Muslim sector through the provision of basic Roman script literacy and further education from their Modernist schools. During colonial times, the Muslim leaders and the *pesantren*<sup>1</sup> played critical roles in warfare and in the tensions between

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<sup>1</sup> Home-grown traditional Islamic institute

inhabitants and the colonizer. That memory has helped to shape the relationship between Islam and nationalism.

Section 4 and 5 highlight the long-standing contentions between Muslims and the state, and section 6 outlines the situation of contemporary Indonesian society and politics. The last part of this article highlights the ongoing conservative turn of Indonesian Islam. In this most current period characterized by pragmatism and postmodernism, Islam appeared as a 'social movement' and the Prophet Muhammad was resuscitated as 'the leader' in the absence of all-encompassing worldly ideologies.

### **The Coming of Islam**

It has been widely accepted that Southeast Asia (today Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, Burma) has long been a crossroads where ideas and people have met, bringing new influences and styles (Ricklefs *et al*, 2010), and Muslims have been in contact with Southeast Asia from shortly after the time of the Prophet himself. Historians contend that when emissaries were sent to the court of China by the third of the Prophet's successors – the Caliph 'Uthman (644-56) – they must have reached there by sea through Southeast Asia (Ricklefs *et al*, 2010). Afterward, Islamic ideas evidently travelled to Southeast Asia along the trade routes. When the Venetian traveller, Marco Polo, visited Sumatra in 1292, he noted the presence of Muslims in some places, and when the Moroccan visitor, Ibn Batuta, visited Samudra Pasai in 1345-1346 he reported that the ruler followed the Shafi'i School of Islamic law, which remains the dominant school throughout Southeast Asia today. Prof. A.H. Johns (see Ricklefs *et al*, 2010:78-79) attempted to explain why the local people only began converting to Islam several centuries after traders had been travelling through Southeast Asia. According

to him, the locals did not convert to Islam until the emergence of Sufism as a dominant stream of Islam throughout the Muslim world from the 13th century. Because the locals' religions before the coming of Islam were characterized by the mystical doctrines of Hinduism and Buddhism so they might have been attracted if this new faith too was presented in a mystical form.

The next phase of Islam in the archipelago was the contact it had with European powers. With the exception of uncolonized Siam (Thailand), Southeast Asia was colonized by almost all the great imperial powers (England, France, Holland, Portugal, Spain and the USA). The first Europeans arrived in Indonesia in 1511, when Portuguese traders sought to monopolize the sources of nutmeg, cloves and pepper in Maluku. After their conquest of the Islamic kingdom on the Malay Peninsula they were followed by Spaniards who both then began to propagate Christianity, being most successful in Maluku. Dutch and British traders followed. They started their quest for Indonesian spices to sell on the European market at very large profits. In 1602 the Dutch established the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) which became the dominant European source of power. For most of the colonial period, Dutch control over the archipelago was tenuous outside of coastal strongholds due to insurgencies, skirmishes, warfares and oppositions in which Muslim communities and leaders played important roles. Diponegoro is one of the most memorable figures in anti-colonial struggle, a man who links the three worlds of rural Java, the aristocracy, and Islam. He was a Javanese prince who had been reared in a rural area where he studied in a *pesantren*, consorted with his teachers and became a devout Islamic mystic. Hence, his reputation is 'the *pesantren* prince'. He once had a mystical experience that he was the *ratu adil* or saviour in Javanese mythology (Pringle, 2010:44). Inspired by the glory of

Majapahit<sup>2</sup> infused with the vision of enacting the *Shariah* law, he fought against the Dutch and their Javanese allies. Diponegoro was arrested in 1830 and sent into exile to his death. Afterward, the Dutch were able to rule Java without any serious opposition. Java experienced, since then, the greatest degree of European involvement and real dominance, and thereby, was much changed by Dutch rule – a process which then shaped the history of 20<sup>th</sup> century Indonesia. The struggles of the Diponegoro war in period of 1808-1830 taught the Dutch an important lesson. In Java as well as in the other islands, they had to identify the ‘friends’, who are the business associates and people who can be co-opted into ruling on their behalf, and those must come from:

a cooperative local elite, almost invariably one whose authority rested on local customs and aristocracy, rather than the countervailing elites who claimed leadership based upon their Islamic learning and piety. Thus the Dutch identified and often accentuated a dichotomy between so-called ‘customary’ or ‘secular’ and Islamic elites (Ricklefs *et al*, 2010:220).

That policy shaped the history of Indonesian Muslims in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, for like most of the states in the Islamic world Indonesia did not emerge at independence, but rather inherited dominance by elites from colonial administration (Joel 1988). Thus, it was merely ‘a later growth of an old tree’ (Nasr Vali, 2001). Additionally, since the end of the Diponegoro war, Javanese society had been conflicted along lines of religious identity which were deepened with the arrival of Reformist Islam ideas (as discussed in the next section), leading to a polarization of nominal (*abangan*) versus pious (*santri*). In post-

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<sup>2</sup> It is believed to be the largest pre-independence kingdom in the archipelago.

colonial Indonesia, the polarization was dangerously politicized (Ricklefs *et al*, 2010:223).

A Novel by Douwes Dekker (1820-1887), *Max Havelaar*, detailing the abuse of colonial power on *Tanam Paksa* (Enforcement Planting) eventually formed the motivation of the new Ethical Policy by which the Dutch government attempted to “repay” their debt to their colonial subjects by providing education. However, it did not deliver widespread educational opportunities other than to some classes of indigenous peoples – generally those members of the elite loyal to the colonial government (Ricklefs *et al*, 2010; Pringle 2010). Frankema (2014:2) argues that the spread of popular education was not only hampered by lack of financial commitment, “but also notable inequalities in the allocation of funds for education and a major reluctance to support investment in private education, which may be interpreted as a consequence of the Dutch metropolitan commitment to secular rule in an overwhelmingly Islamic society”.

The first educational reforms were at higher levels which brought together some of the most intelligent Indonesians who proceeded to produce the earliest leaders of anti-colonial movements. In 1889, one of the founders of the Ethical Policy, Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, arrived in Indonesia. He is most remembered for the divide-and-conquer realpolitik deployed firstly to win the Aceh War (1873-1912). Regarding Islam, Hurgronje was “more than mildly contemptuous of the Dutch colonial regime’s ignorance of the faith. He pointed out, with good reasons, that his compatriots had both exaggerated and underestimated Islam’s power” (Pringle 2010:47). He made it very clear that there was no well-organized central authority similar to the Papacy existing in Islam, and that the absence of priestly authority between God and man and the authority operated through a network of Islamic clerics are amongst the

defining characteristics of this religion. Hurgronje also argued that the power of Islam was nurtured by the pilgrimage to Mecca and the contact made there with foreign Muslims. Coincidentally, the opening of the Suez Canal, connecting the Red Sea and the Mediterranean in 1869, caused the pilgrimage (*hajj*) traffic from Indonesia to the Middle East to grow dramatically and the spread of steam shipping around the same time made travel to the Arabian Peninsula easier and faster (Ricklefs 2010). Nevertheless, Hurgronje disagreed with the Dutch colonial government's decision to place limits on the pilgrimage to restrict the flow of priestly subversives. He also resisted the Dutch assumption that since Indonesian Islam remained coloured by local superstition it should then be easy for Christian Missionary conversion.

Even in those parts of Java in which orthodox Islam has gained the least grip upon the population...the Hindu *pandit* (priest) would experience as great difficulties in communicating with simple peasants as would the Christian missionary; yet the Muslim Kyai if he deigns to stoop to this lowly creature, is assured of a deferential hearing. (Quoted in Pringle, 2010:47)

Instead, Hurgronje suggested offering a *modus vivendi* to the majority of moderate Muslims including lifting restrictions on the pilgrimage while "ruthlessly suppressing political fanatics promoting rebellion" (Pringle, 2010:48). To carry this out successfully he proposed the political utility of indigenous pre-Islamic institutions and leaders, including the Javanese aristocracy and the customary leaders in the Outer Islands, as a force to counter expanding Islam (Pringle, 2010). Thus, his strategy was to oppose Islam to *Adat* (local custom). He also believed very strongly that Islam would inexorably gain ground unless the Dutch promoted Dutch values, and especially Western education (Pringle 2010:49). Hurgronje's strategy was grounded in scholarship. He spoke and read



Arabic, wrote copiously about Islam, and helped Vollenhoven establish a prestigious school of *adat* law at Leiden University in the Netherlands. According to Pringle (2010), the substantial studies of *adat* covering the whole of The Indies were pointless because they were used only to 'please' the locals since in reality the *adat* were not effective in protecting the locals' interests. Pringle enumerated the reasons:

These volumes were supposedly no more than "guides" to *adat* law, which in theory cannot be codified because it is mostly oral and would lose a necessary element of flexibility if committed to writing. This notwithstanding, *adat* became a formal part of the Dutch colonial legal system, which featured different codes for Europeans, native Indonesians, and foreign minorities such as Chinese, and it remains an important element of Indonesian law today. (p. 49)

While the Dutch authorities continued to police the *hajj* and set up an office in Jeddah to spy on the pilgrims (Pringle, 2010:49), the Dutch began to support a limited amount of education. In the later development, as the global depression pinched colonial revenues and the rise of political unrest led by educated Indonesians caused increasing problems, Dutch enthusiasm for education of all kinds was dampened. As is shown in the 1930 census – after several decades of effort by Islamic, Christian, government and other schools – the Roman literacy rate in indigenous languages across Indonesia was only 7.4 per cent, and the literacy rate in Dutch was only 0.3 per cent, for the Dutch had never made it a priority to teach their language to Indonesians (Ricklefs *et al*, 2010:221). On the other hand, *cultuurstelsel*<sup>3</sup> that rested upon compulsory labour had

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<sup>3</sup> Regulations issued by the Dutch government which required each villager to give a part of their land for the planting of crops for the export market at a price that is pre-determined. The villagers who had no land had to work 75 days a year in the government fields.

created opportunities for indigenous entrepreneurs in such fields as shipping, bricklaying, smithing, etc. The newly emerging Javanese commercial middle class and outer island entrepreneurs often had connections with Arab trading communities in the coastal cities including those who supported the Middle Eastern Islamic reform movement. As a result, more Indonesians could afford the pilgrimage (*hajj*) to Mecca where they encountered reformism first-hand.

### **Misunderstanding between the Warriors and the Sages began**

Toward the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the increasing use of steamships, the Suez Canal, the Ethical Policy, and educational reform of the Dutch, all coalesced to give rise to a division of society into three groups with three different anti-colonial strategies:

1. Secular-Nationalist
2. Reformist Islam
3. Traditionalist Islam

As for the second and the third groups, the increased mobility around the Muslim world explained Laffan's (2003) argument that "pilgrimage and the wider Muslim world from the last quarter of the nineteenth century were crucial in shaping the imagined notion of the archipelago as a region" (p.310) given that the Arab Reformist ideas at the time combined nationalist political tendencies with strong Islamic convictions. This time also marked the onset of what I termed 'misunderstandings between the *warriors* and the *sages*' among the Muslims that appeared recurrently in the later centuries of Indonesia. It is a misunderstanding when one's *personality trait* determines his/her actions and that makes him/her in disagreement with another regarding what is an appropriate response, according to Islamic teachings, to the challenges brought by the interactions with the West and

modernity. In other words, the *personality trait* is propounded as basic human motivation and pattern of behavior, to explain why there are people who are inclined to be the *sages*; or, *warriors*; or, *economic players*; or, *workers*. Perennial philosophers use the *personality traits* concept to explain the underlying philosophy of 'castes' in Hinduism (Nasr, 1989:179). The traditionalists, resonating the *sages* trait, coexisted relatively easily with many older elements in local customs (*adat*), whereas the reformists at the time, resonating the *warriors* trait, strived to close the gap with the secular West by purging Islam of allegedly improper, locally derived practices ascribed to *adat*. Accordingly, the reformists opposed fiercely syncretistic practices for which no precedent could be found in the Quran and Hadith, reflecting their commitment to the revitalization of Islam in the face of the West's ascendancy. Furthermore, there were some among the reformists who gradually took an 'apologetic turn' and cast Islam as the 'religion of reason' (e.g. see Euben, 1997). The latter then were called early 'Modernist Muslims'. Two famous names that are now forever associated with Islamic reform and modernism are Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh. From this point in time the diversity of Islamic movement as seen today emerged.

As for the secular-nationalist group mentioned at the outset of this section, very few of these pre-independence intelligentsias were known as fervent Muslims, given the criteria of who had access to modern education. This small but influential number of Indonesians went to study in Holland. Their stereotyped image of the "condescending colonial Dutch" (Pringle, 2010:55) was changed when they were exposed to Leftist Western thinking and returned home secularized. They would become the future protagonists of a secular-nationalist-socialist ideology in periods to come which is the root of

insurmountable disagreements between their views and those of the Muslims' in the later era of Indonesia. The disagreements are twofold, i.e. firstly, the differences in philosophies<sup>4</sup>, and secondly, Islam's rejection of nationalism as much as it is against tribalism and racism<sup>5</sup>. Both reflect the 'clash of symbolic universe', namely, Islam against nationalism and 'westernism' (see Alkatiri, 2014).

By the end of World War II, Indonesians were becoming more aware of the anti-colonial movements. For the members of the westernized secular elites mentioned earlier, confronting Dutch power was too risky compared to hoping for improvements through cooperation (Pringle, 2010), but for the devout Muslims who became the intelligentsia within the framework of Islamic scholarship, the alternative source lay in the new ideas from the Middle East, namely, reformist Islam. The reformists, including Kyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan (1868-1923),

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<sup>4</sup> Ricklefs *et al* (2010:469) puts rightly about profound cultural differences between Western and Islam: "The former generally emphasizes the idea of freedom as a means of liberating individual and social potential for good. The latter generally emphasizes the need to control freedom to restrict the individual and social potential for evil. It seeks justice rather than freedom".

<sup>5</sup> The important feature of the *pesantren* in relation to the future 'global-local' tensions between Indonesian Muslims and the nationalists is rooted in how the *pesantren* has nurtured fertile ground for the development of the ideal of unity of the Islamic world and the concept of the global *Ummah* – the single world Muslim community – which is rooted in Islamic principles. On that, Bruinessen (1994: 121-145) has said:

There is something paradoxical in the *pesantren* tradition. It is firmly rooted in the Indonesian soil, the *pondok* and *pesantren* may be called a typically Indonesian institution, in several respects unlike traditional schools elsewhere in the Muslim world. But at the same time this tradition is self-consciously international in orientation and continues to see not some place in the archipelago but Mecca as its focus or orientation.

the founding father of Muhammadiyah, are the products of this process in this period.

### **Explaining Muhammadiyah with Symbolic Interactionism**

Dahlan was born in a pious entrepreneur Muslim family in Yogyakarta. He is believed to be in the lineage of Maulana Malik Ibrahim, one of the nine *walis*<sup>6</sup>. He was reared in traditionalist *pesantren*. At the age of 15, he went to hajj. He stayed in Mecca for 5 years studying Islam from where he encountered the ideas of Muslim thinkers associated with Islam reformism such as Afghani, Abduh, Rasyid Rida and Ibn Taymiyah (Muhammadiyah, 2012). Two years after he went home, he went to hajj again and stayed for another two years further studying Islam from Syekh Ahmad Khatib, who happened to be the same teacher of Kyai Haji Hasjim Asy'arie, the founder of the NU. Returning home in 1904, Dahlan was accepted to be a teacher at OSVIA in Yogyakarta, a civil servant and teacher school run by the Dutch colonial regime. However, he also joined organizations for the struggle for independence movement, both of the secular and the Muslim nationalist activists: Boedi Utomo, Syarikat Islam, Jam'iyatul Khair; Pembela Kanjeng Nabi Muhammad SAW. Dahlan was deeply concerned with poverty and backwardness of Muslims in Indonesia. Importantly, Dahlan was immensely moved by *Surah al-Maun* of the Quran and decided to devote his life to propagate the verse in order to bring justice towards the orphans, the needy and the hungry (Muhammadiyah, 2012). Influenced by the thinking of Abduh aforementioned, in 1912 Dahlan founded Muhammadiyah (literally, the way of Muhammad) as a welfare organization based on Reformist ideology and emphasizing modern education as an anti-

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<sup>6</sup> Nine revered saints who spread Islam in the archipelago.

colonial strategy (Pringle, 2010; Fuad, 2004). He and reformist Islam at the time argued that tradition is the culprit for the backward condition of the Muslims, thus, the tradition was viewed as having buried deep the real Islam and its power (Fuad, 2004:403). Therefore, the key to closing the gap with the secular West was to purify and revitalize Islam from un-Islamic locally derived customs and propagate the return to the Quran and *Sunna*. The Dutch colonial government found a mutual interest for the possibilities of a Dutch inspired system of education, as they needed to introduce Western education in order to create a lower level workforce for its administrative offices. Henceforth, the green-light was given to Muhammadiyah's activities that recognized the need of modern education and wanted to make an instrument of change that might improve the Indonesian Muslim community. What follows explicates the interactions between Dahlan and the West and modernity (see Fuad, 2004:402-405).

The Dutch's green-light seemed to have been responded to by Dutch Christian missionary groups as well, to build and operate not only schools but also hospitals in various places in Java. These had stirred and inspired Dahlan. Modelled on Christian missionary examples, Muhammadiyah focused its energy on proselytizing, education and welfare by establishing hospitals and modern schools, "He had found them to be the exact programmes he needed in order to achieve his desire both to improve the wretched condition of the Muslim communities and to propagate the words of Islam" (Fuad, 2004:403). Notably, cited in Fuad (2004:413), Alfian (1989:160-161)'s account shows that Dahlan was good friends with some Christian priests. Using a symbolic interactionist perspective in sociology, in which meaning is considered "a central part of a person's definition of the situation, which eventuates in action

of some sort” (Reynolds and Kinney, 2003:887), an explanation follows:

In “*Theorizing Muhammad’s Nation*” (Alkatiri, 2014), I explicate the relationships between meaning, cognition and action to explain the very complicated subject of religion-inspired actions. From the interactionist perspective, ‘reality’ is not given but created through our interactions with one another. Dahlan’s interactions with the Dutch, Christian missionaries and secular nationalist activists did define the ‘reality’ of Muslims’ backwardness and poverty for him, and thus, the hope and aspiration of progress from modern education. At the same time though, Islamic symbolic universe such as the *Surah al-Ma’un* of the Quran, remained the all-embracing conception of meaning, and hence, of action, for him to respond to that ‘reality’. That would be clearer if we look at his refutation to the traditionalists that follows. The traditionalists accused Dahlan of actually inventing a new religion by his way of imitating the Christian Dutch, and Dahlan refuted, saying: “Muhammadiyah attempt to raise Islam from its decadence”. He said further, “too many Muslims rely on the exegesis, instead of the original source, which is the Quran and Hadith themselves. So, we call the *Ummah* to return to the Quran and Hadith instead.” (Muhammadiyah, 2012). With this in mind I suggest a symbolic interactionist and symbolic universe perspective to explain the other reformist Muslims’ thinking and actions, including that of Afghani and Abduh afore-mentioned. In 1938 Muhammadiyah claimed to have 1774 schools, 31 public libraries and 834 mosques and prayer houses and, with Muhammadiyah in the lead, “Muslim schools soon created a literate<sup>7</sup> Muslim citizenry which

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<sup>7</sup> Literacy in Roman script.

numerically by far surpassed the few Indonesians versed in Western ways" (Benda, 1958:56).

As a reaction to the growing strength of Muhammadiyah, which appeared to challenge both the traditionalist Islamic style and the status of traditionalist elite, Nahdlatul Ulama, which means, 'the rise of religious scholars' was then established in 1926. It was by Kyai Haji Wahab Chasbullah with the support of East Java's most respected traditionalist scholar, Kyai Haji Hasjim Asy'arie, precisely to protect the institutions and practices that were criticized by the reformists. Although East Java was always the heartland of NU, it spread to all other parts of the archipelago. From 1930-1940, Muhammadiyah had established branches over most of Indonesia, and the NU began to found economic and social activities besides its primary function as the guardian of its traditionalist Islamic practices. Both were active in anti-colonial movements although in opposing directions. The NU forbade the *kyai* and *santri* from wearing pantaloons and ties for this being an imitation of the Dutch. From such a cultural movement the NU had been able to produce a society that contributed greatly to the struggle for the independence of Indonesia. Conversely, Muhammadiyah created schools along modern lines where the Dutch language was used and its schools soon became equivalent in quality to the Dutch, Catholic and Protestant schools. During the Japanese occupation of Indonesia (1942-1945), the two organizations sat together in a federation of reformists and traditionalists, Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia – Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims), that was sponsored by the Japanese military authorities and explicitly created to support the Japanese in World War 2. Masyumi was born in 1943 and was intended to draw on a genuine Islamic base, and in March 1945, the Japanese established an Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI) to



draft a constitution. The representatives of Masyumi were present in the committee with the other founding fathers of Indonesia.

The draft of the future state ideology, Pancasila (Sanskrit: five principles) as the Djakarta Charter was signed on June 22, 1945, by the future President, Sukarno, the future vice President, Hatta, and others including seven Muslim politicians as the representatives of Masyumi. On August 17, 1945, the independence of Indonesia was declared by Sukarno and Hatta in Jakarta but seven of the words on the first principle (*sila*) of Pancasila stipulated in the Djakarta Charter disappeared. In the *charter* it was specified as “Belief in God with obligation for adherents of Islam to carry out *Shariah* (Islamic Law)” but in the constitution proclaimed on August 17, 1945 it was altered to the simple “Belief in God.” The intrigues behind the incident were complex. The original *sila* seemed to imply that the state would be responsible for implementing this provision, and would thus be some sort of quasi-Islamic State. The seven words were aborted in response to objections by Indonesian Christians, and it was reported that Eastern Indonesia would secede if those words were retained (Pringle, 2010; Ricklefs *et al*, 2010). At the end of October 1945 the Allied Forces returned to Indonesia and by then, on October 22, NU had proclaimed ‘holy war’ against the Dutch and made participation obligatory for all Muslims. The jihad resolution led to the ‘Battle of Surabaya’ in November 1945.

Indonesian independence was finally proclaimed but, as Pringle (2010:69) puts it, “the Jakarta Charter refused to recede quietly into the mist of history”. For Muslims, the loss of those seven words has stripped Pancasila bare of its spiritual meaning. In the fieldwork of this research, one leader of Hidayatullah gave a copy of a book published quite recently

(2011) about that particular issue<sup>8</sup>. In respect of the role of Islam in the struggle for independence, Laffan (2003) has been able to show convincingly that the seeds of what would become Indonesian nationalism germinated in two cities in the central lands of Islam – Mecca and Medina – as much as in Leiden (through some Indonesians who studied there) or Batavia (now Jakarta, where many Indonesian secular activists expressed their desire for independence). Notwithstanding, the disputes over the ideals of independence between the Islamic ideals and secular nationalists are as different as night and day. The nationalists believed in pursuing independence to create a nation-state for love and attachment to the motherland: *ibu pertiwi*, or *tanah air*. The Muslim clerics opposed such a nationalist sentiment that demanded complete allegiance. For them, freedom is the rights of every human being as advocated by Islam and thereby cannot be pursued for any other goals than the praise of God alone. Otherwise they will fall into a state of *shirk* for deification of something other than God (Noer, 1996:281)<sup>9</sup>. The tensions between Islamic and secular nationalisms continued to plague the history of Indonesia<sup>10</sup> and

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<sup>8</sup> “*Telaah Kritis Dasar Falsafah Negara Republik Indonesia* (critical review of Republic Indonesia’s constitution)” by H. Bambang Setyo MSc, Introduction by Prof. Dr. Hamdan Zoelva, SH, MH, Judge of Constitutional Court.

<sup>9</sup> Quoting *Hindia Baru*, May 30, 1925.

<sup>10</sup> For example: In the 1960s when Sukarno attempted to blend nationalism, communism and religion (including Islam) into a national ideology NASAKOM and the NU leadership decided to support, that caused a great distress among the *kyai* (the *pesantren* leaders) (Pringle, 2010:116). Another example, although NU and Masyumi declared in 1945 that resistance against the returning Allied Forces in defense of the new Indonesia Fatherland was a ‘holy war,’ when peace and independence arrived in 1949, and the state turned out to be a secular rather than an Islamic state, “most Indonesians were uncertain and divided about the

eventually evolved into the most recent development, namely, the 'Islamic nationalist camp' against 'the trans-national Islamists'. In that respect, the NU congress in 2015 coined 'Islam Nusantara' (Islam of the archipelago) to contest the upturn of transnational Islam. The NU claimed to promote a peaceful Islam as *rahmatan lil alamin* (a blessing for the universe) which is believed to be the hallmark of Indonesian Islam. Over and above, by promoting 'Islam Nusantara' the NU proclaimed a firm stance to protect Pancasila and NKRI (the unitary Indonesian state) against 'anti-national' Islamic ideologies. Inversely, to the other camp, the idea of 'Islam Nusantara' appeared as a notion devised to escape from the universalism of Islam and from the spirit of brotherhood of the *Ummah*.

Just as importantly about Islam and nationalism in Indonesia is the history behind the 'dual-system' education. Sirozi (2010) shows that contemporary plurality of education in Indonesia has its root back in the colonial legacy. Given that both secular and religious nationalist leaders have developed separate education programs since the colonial era, the new government of Sukarno found it difficult to define the character of the national education system. Under an urgent need of political compromise, it was partially and temporally overcome by the implementation of a 'dual system'. That is, the education model demanded by secular nationalists was accompanied by the religious education model demanded by Muslim leaders. The former was termed "*general*", run by Department of

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place of political Islam in the new Republic" (Pringle, 2010:65). The tension never ceases to manifest in different forms. The most reason issues were about the flag-raising ceremony which is accompanied by the national anthem of Indonesia (Indonesia Raya) where people should salute the flag. The practice has been increasingly criticized by the revivalists Islamists and caused heated debates since 2011 (see Metronews, 2011; ustadzaris.com, 2011; muslim.or.id, 2011).

Education and Culture, and the latter, “Islamic”, run by the Department of Religious Affairs. The result is a “complex, hard to follow and dualistic system” (Naim, 1996). While the “general” curriculum was designed to fulfill the state needs and aimed at training citizens to have “national identity”, the “Islamic” curriculum was characterized by Muslim values to attain inner perfection and develop a “Muslim identity”. The “general” emphasized the social aspect of responsibility, the “Islamic” emphasized religious responsibility. Both were apparently underpinned by different philosophies, and thus, continue to “run side by side like railway tracks, separated from one another” to the present day (Naim, 1996). In fact, the ‘dual system’ is the child of “Twin Pregnancy” in the title of this article<sup>11</sup>.

### **Marginalization of Political Islam**

Pringle (2010) contends that marginalization of Political Islam began with the era of the first President. Masyumi was banned by Sukarno in 1960 after its frequent clashes with Sukarno and the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party). Nationalism was the dominant force of Sukarno’s regime with Sukarno as its chief commander. He established Pancasila as a state ideology that was hoped to become a foundation for national identity. Given the tremendous diversity of Indonesian society, it was hoped that it would be a guide in creating a harmonious society based on religious tolerance, humanism, nationalism, democracy and social justice. At that time, however, Indonesians were not really sure who they were, whether they belonged to their regional, or ethnic, or religious,

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<sup>11</sup> For elaborate discussion about the clash between modern knowledge system and Islam, see the debates on Muslim’s reconstruction of knowledge project (Alkatiri, 2016b).

or ideological identity (Pringle, 2010). So, in 1957 Sukarno declared Guided Democracy, a non-system of personal, authoritarian rule. He assumed, and many Indonesians agreed, that he alone could achieve national unity (Pringle, 2010:67). Thus, his famous statement:

“I have made myself the meeting place of all trends and ideologies. I have blended, blended, and blended them until finally they became the present Sukarno” (Latif, 2008, p.306)

Nevertheless, he was also aware of the incompatibility between Islam and the idea of a nation-state. In one of his speeches, Sukarno rhetorically asked, “[...] can the Nationalist movement be joined with the Islamic movement, which essentially denies the nation? [...] With full conviction, I answer: “Yes!”” (Sukarno, 1970: 38-9, in Burhanudin and Dijk, 2003). Not only did the government ban Masyumi and eliminate Islamic political power, but in the 1960s it also began to restrict the political activities of Muslim politicians (Hasbullah, 2002). Many activists were put in jail, and that had a big impact,

“on the one hand, people had become aware that the Sukarno government, during Guided Democracy, was tyrannical, and therefore had to be overthrown. On the other hand, people had become afraid they had to think carefully before opposing the government” (Noer, 1987:415, in Hasbullah, 2002:7).

Further, Hasbullah noted that Muslim hatred of Sukarno and his chief supporters, the PKI, was great, and perhaps this was why Muslims were active in helping the New Order demolish the Old Order.

Like other infant post-colonial States, the history of the new Indonesian Republic was replete with civil war, social upheaval and horrific events. Five of the most significant are: the disputes over seven words in the Jakarta Charter (1945)

afore-mentioned, the Communist-led Madiun Affair (1948), the Darul Islam uprising (1948-1962), the Outer Islands Rebellion (1957-1958) and the communal killings of the anti-communist revolution of 1965-1966 that have profoundly troubled Indonesians to this day. Social upheaval and political turmoil in post-colonial Indonesia seemed to be inescapable. Notably, among the states of Asia who won independence after World War II, only Vietnam and Indonesia did so through armed revolution (Ricklefs *et al*, 2010). Moreover, there had been long-standing conflicts that people across the archipelago had had with the colonial government. That means the struggles over independence had become customary among people at the time and resisting legitimacy of the colonial state was part of their everyday lives. Consequently, the new State had difficulty in reversing this trend as Nasr Vali (2005) also noted in most places in early independence era, and these were done by using culture. The national elite did not have much more to offer than to foist an indigenous nationalism on the general population by constantly reasserting the State's ideology. Nasr Vali (2005:12) says:

Having initiated the masses to resisting authority, the nationalist elite were then saddled with the problem of establishing order over a more unruly society. Without the relations of order between the State and its subjects in place, the post-colonial State became more dependent on ideology to get consent to rule.

In the Muslim world the problems were compounded by an ideological challenge from below, which took the form of "Islamism" – "a form whose power rested in the claim that it was not tainted by a connection with the West and that it has a base among the masses" (Nasr Vali, 2005:11).

## Indonesian Muslims and Development

Many have commented about the invidious consequences that the new nation-state formation has brought to diverse people as they were incorporated by force, into large, impersonal, and usually irresponsible, nation-states (Bodley, 1990). Drawing on empirical cases from Indonesia and a comparative literature review of African states, my article (Alkatiri, 2018) reveals a huge dilemma in the desire to build a solid nation-state within a deeply-pluralistic society. The following discussion features a lethal combination of integralism<sup>12</sup> and developmentalism embodied in nationalism and the modern-Western concepts of 'progress' and nationhood, upon which all Third World nation-states' ideologies were anchored leading to the destruction of their social and natural environments.

Sukarno was ousted in the 1965 anti-communism revolution and these events were immensely traumatic to many Indonesians until the present day. His successor, General Suharto, ruled Indonesia with his heavy-handed regime for 32 years. Suharto's greatest achievement was to promote successfully Indonesia's economic development, including the development in small towns and rural areas. Therefore, he was dubbed *Bapak Pembangunan*: the father of development. From the chaos of Sukarno's 'old order,' the New Order regime constructed a rapidly growing and modernizing economy built upon extractive industries, particularly in the outer islands, with the help of sudden flows of foreign investment. Yet, the physical development was heavily concentrated in Java. The Outer Islanders became even more convinced that Jakarta's rule was robbing them as the major producers of Indonesia's export

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<sup>12</sup> Integralism is an ideology according to which a nation is an organic unity (see more in Alkatiri, 2018)

earnings from oil, minerals, logs and timber, rubber and other cash crops. Their grievances triggered secession movements in the later years. Thus, ironically, an archipelago that before European colonization was connected economically by inter-island trade even though with limited political coherence, was now held together by a nation-state but with fewer independent economic links. The situation recalls Renan (1882:892) who says, "nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist." Anderson (1983) also argues that in newly independent states a 'subjective antiquity' interestingly appears in the eyes of the nationalists. Along this line, Nasr Vali (2001:10) added that "the machinery of government was operated by the resurgence of traditional conceptions of authority which has taken the form of neo-patrimonialism"<sup>13</sup>. Those aforesaid have been particularly true in Indonesia during the New Order. Hasbullah (2002:7), among others, noted that "Suharto personalized himself as a Javanese king and internalized the Javanese values and history inherited from his predecessors". In the later period, that cultural bent incited a bitter indignation on the part of the Outer Islanders. For them nationalism was merely Javanization as part of the hegemonization of the ruler in Jakarta. Beginning in 1978, a national indoctrination programme, P4, was undertaken to inculcate the values of Pancasila in all citizens, especially school children and civil servants. Pancasila as an expression of nationalism was now used as an instrument of social and political control. It was even made sacred: the day of

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<sup>13</sup> Further, "While certainly being rational and modern, it interestingly is itself the product of colonialism, which protected and nurtured traditional institutions of authority and furthermore bolstered its paternalistic view of governance through similar colonial conception" (Nasr Vali 2001:10).



the military coup by anti-communist generals, October 1, is commemorated every year as the 'Sacred Pancasila Day.'

In reference to polarization of "nominal *abangan* and pious *santri*" by the Dutch's policy since the end of Diponegoro War (see Section 2), throughout the Suharto's New Order period, economic capital was largely in the hands of a Chinese minority, while political capital was in the hands of the *abangan* Javanese *priyayi*. At the same time the pious *santri* had been economically and politically marginalized: as Wertheim (1975) puts it, they are "the outsiders". According to Hefner (1997:78), "He (*Suharto*) was essentially hostile to Islam." Hefner added that many Indonesianists believed that "the Suharto government was a resolute defender of *abangan* Javanese values, deeply opposed to anything that might expand Muslim influence in Indonesian politics and society" (Hasbullah, 2002:78). The Indonesian Muslim community attitudes are typically those of a minority group (Wertheim, 1975; Schwarz, 1997). Hasbullah (2002:6) says:

In general, this is because politically and economically they were always on the periphery and were onlookers of the power circle, or borrowing Wertheim's words, "the representatives of the Moslem community have rather consistently been assigned an outsider's role" (1975:75). Therefore, far from establishing an Islamic state, or at least holding a political hegemony, over the past decades they were the marginalized group and their political terrain was peripheral. Regarded as being under long political coercion from various Javanese kingdoms, then the European colonial regime and, after the 1945 independence, from Sukarno's and Soeharto's authoritarian regimes, the Muslim community has long been the 'outsiders.'

Hasbullah (2002) notes that the attempt of Muslims to re-establish Masyumi in 1968 was refused by Suharto, who was

backed by the military. The ban was also followed by the barring of Masyumi leaders from participation in the newly formed Parmusi party. Furthermore, in 1985, under the Catholic military Commander General Benny Moerdani, the regime executed a massacre of hundreds of Muslims in the 1984 Tanjung Priok (Jakarta) 'closed-case' (Hasbullah, 2002). Once again, the government removed Islamic bases from all political parties and mass organizations by insisting on Azas Tunggal Pancasila (Pancasila, the Only State Ideology). It has been long accepted that Suharto's regime was also authoritarian and based on the power of military. On that regard Ricklefs *et al* (2010:383) notes:

The army clamped down on all dissent, restrained only by the limitations of Indonesia's ramshackle bureaucratic structures. The military had no compunction about banning publications and imprisoning, torturing, or murdering opponents. Regime violence was particularly unrestrained in the outlying areas of Aceh, East Timor and Papua, where there were separatist sentiments and guerrilla resistance.

The Indonesian Muslims felt seriously frustrated since they were not able to increase their political position amidst economic disparities.

The military created a condominium over the country relying on itself and the bureaucracy. Student activists and Islamic leaders were soon alienated by their exclusion from the core of the regime and by its increasingly obvious corruption. Indeed it was the regime's ever more extravagant corruption that did most to undermine its legitimacy as years went by. Ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs built mutually lucrative alliances with members of the military elite, thereby exacerbating widespread anti-Chinese feelings in the country (Ricklefs *et al*, 2010:383).

It is worth noting, since many Indonesian Chinese are Christians, inequality in wealth and power has frequently triggered ethnic and religious conflicts up to this time.

As a matter of fact, inequality of opportunity was precipitated by the reality that during the first years of the New Order period when developmentalism began its traction, the majority of Muslims were 'uneducated' and therefore unable to supply manpower to meet the surge in demands for 'qualified' human resources. They were poor and lacking skills, in Ali Murtopo's<sup>14</sup> words (1989), Muslims are the '*orang sawah*' – a term that associates them with an unskilled rural society. CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies), a high-level think-tank dominated in the 1970s by Ali Moertopo, is the institution that did more than any other to marry "integralist and developmentalist ideology" mentioned earlier (Bourchier, 2001:118). CSIS supplied the blueprint and the ideological rationale to reform the political landscape, and was fully committed to 'accelerated modernisation'. Most of its senior staffs were Catholics whose view of politics was strongly colored by a particular brand of catholic social theory and a preference for corporatist formula (Bourchier, 2001). As the political arena was dominated by activists who came from a secular nationalist, Christian, socialist background (Hasbullah, 2002), and non-Muslim political actors were holding important positions within the circles of the New Order elites, many in Muslim circles came to the conclusion that "the New Order government has been hijacked by an anti-Muslim alliances of Chinese, Catholics, former PSI socialists, and armed officers. Most fingers pointed to Major General Ali Murtopo as the mastermind behind these policies." (Hefner, 1997:78). This condition led to a psychology of 'defeat,' where, as a majority,

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<sup>14</sup> Prominent general and Suharto's intelligence aide

they had to face the reality that in fact they are weak in power. They were only a majority in numbers but a minority in quality. In turn, the Muslim majority turned out to be a minority in mentality (Hasbullah 2002), and, as implied by Schwarz (1997:129), this is clearly an “anomaly.”

Schwarz concludes that the anomaly of a majority group that feels it is treated like a minority is often found in the relationship between and within Indonesia’s religious communities. Schwarz feels that, “Muslim leaders often sound and act like members of a persecuted minority” (1997, pp.129-30). When Muslims were enduring the most extreme political suppression at the beginning of the New Order, Mohammad Natsir, a Masjumi leader, expressed his anger by accurately and sorrowfully describing this condition: “They have treated us like cats with ring worm.” (McVey, 1983:199).

Surveying Suharto’s authoritarian government, Wertheim (1975:88, in Hasbullah 2002) concludes:

No doubt, the ummat Islam in Indonesia feels seriously frustrated. Not only has Islam not been able to increase its political position since Soekarno’s fall; in fact Islam has been relegated to a position rather similar to the one it occupied during the colonial period. In this sense, too, the Soeharto regime could be called “neo-colonialist.” As during colonial times, the regime wants Islamic organizations to refrain from any political activity and to stick to innocuous, purely religious pursuits”

In respect of that, Many Third World authors on development studies write about this particular issue regarding national elites who turn to being ‘new colonialists’. Two of India’s leading scientists and environmental activists, Vandana Shiva and Jayanta Bandyopadhyay (Court, 1990:189), argue:

Economic Growth was a new colonialism, draining resources away from those who needed them most. The

discontinuity lay in the fact that it was now new national elites, not colonial powers, that masterminded the exploitation on grounds of “national interests” and growing gross national products, and it was accomplished with more powerful technologies of appropriation and destruction.

According to Nasr Vali (2005), the imperatives of hegemony and growth are particularly challenging to post-colonial states:

The continuity between the colonial and postcolonial states has to do with the fact that at the moment of independence an underdeveloped indigenous bourgeoisie was unable to contain the overdeveloped colonial state or to countervail the formidable alliances with key classes and social groups that bolstered colonial authority. Equally significant was the fact that the ruling bureaucratic elite that had managed the colonial state remain in control after independence. They had been a product of colonialism and had internalized its values of governance (p.10).

Furthermore, because “colonialism saddled the postcolonial state with attitudes and ambitions that have redoubled its desire for hegemony .. yet made its attainment more elusive” (Nasr Vali, 2005:11). As well, the disparagement of Islam by later generations of Muslim<sup>15</sup> governments had been much shaped by the colonial attitude to religion, particularly to Islam (p.42).

## **Indonesia Today**

Contemporary Indonesian society and politics are characterized by decentralization, fragmentation, systemic patronage, corruption, and nationalism that remain a dominant force. To complicate the situation further, these occurrences

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<sup>15</sup> He described the case of India and Pakistan.

took place in coincidence with two global forces of contradictory nature: on the one hand, postmodernism that extols local narratives and diversity to replace grand and universal narratives, thus, the revival of *adat* (local customary); and on the other hand, the rise of radical Islam that calls for unity of the global Muslim community, the *Ummah*, which gave rise to some degrees of global-local tensions on the religious level of the Indonesian Muslims. Against that background, one can argue that 'Islam Nusantara' was devised to contest the upturn of transnational (or global) Islam, and the NU, whose authority was most challenged by the rise of transnational groups in Indonesia, is the plausible enterprise to promote it. In that way of looking, one can argue further that 'Islam Nusantara' is mere sloganeering that carries political baggage. Detailed accounts that follow may reinforce such an argument.

### **1. Nationalism and Adat-Revival in the Midst of Globalization**

Even in the present day, Indonesian nationalism remains a dominant force. In correspondence with Berger and Luckmann (1991), Benedict Anderson (2006) contends that nationality and nationalism are cultural artefacts of a particular kind, and that to understand properly why today they command such a profound emotional legitimacy needs careful consideration of historical context. This has been particularly true to Indonesia in the light of its pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial pasts, and how the country has constantly been threatened by internal clashes along both ideological and regional fault lines. That has nurtured a fear of internal revolt and disintegration, and therefore, a besieged mentality with regard to internal enemies, particularly Islam. Anti-Malaysia is another recurrent theme (see Noor, 2009).

In a deeply pluralistic society such as Indonesia, pluralism of norms has always been a concern. Because of these, legal anthropology and legal pluralism are recognized as important subjects in the Indonesian universities. In Indonesian law, *adat*, Islam, and positive law of statutes, are each considered to be the sources of law. The Indonesian word *adat* is often translated as 'custom' or 'customary law'. *Adat* has a wide range of usages. It has multiple meanings and often conflicting implications. The concept has become quite complicated as it has been interpreted in several ways throughout Indonesian history, reflecting the social situation in each period. The birth of *adat* law was midwived by Vollenhoven at the school of *adat* law in Leiden University in the 1920s, as discussed earlier (see Section 2). Originally, the mere customs of the colony could not be considered as a form of law (Takano 2008) but Vollenhoven overturned that. However, the informal and uncodified character of most *adat*, and the idealization of order and stability, makes *adat* easy to be manipulated politically. In this regard, Davidson and Henley (2007) use the term "The protean politics of *adat*". Hurgronje's policy used *adat* law as a smokescreen to prevent the Muslims from endorsing *Shariah* law.

On the other hand, for the nationalists, the triumph of *adat* law school was both good and bad. The acknowledgement of *adat* laws meant that different ethnic groups were supposed to be governed according to their own diverse laws and customs which mean undermining the nationalists' attempt to draw a national unity in diversity. Yet, Sukarno's Guided Democracy and especially Suharto's New Order invoked *adat* and emphasized the shared characteristics of *adat* such as *gotong royong* (mutual aid) and *musyawarah-mufakat* (unanimous agreement

reached after thorough discussion) to assure obedience to authority (see Bouchier, 1997). In this respect, Thorburn (2002) noted the protean nature of *adat* in relation to the devastation of natural resources during Suharto's reign. The New Order regime uniquely combined 'traditional' Javanese patrimonialism, deference, and social stratification with 'unfettered capitalistic acquisition and expansion', and, with a liberal dose of military power and pomp. Thorburn (2002:618) says:

This mixture gave rise to a development juggernaut that undermined existing local social and normative orders as ruthlessly as it depleted forests and other natural riches. Prominent motifs permeating New Order society and governance included frequent references to *adat* and the ubiquitous political mantras *musyawarah* (deliberation) and *mufakat* (consensus). These were invoked as justifications for a range of political measures and economic policies, and to censure anyone who tried to object. The same "myth of *adat*" was conjured as well by the regime's critics, and by local communities attempting to retain or regain some control over the pace or direction of local change.

The fall of the Suharto's regime in 1998 was followed by a rapid decentralization movement. It also marked the beginning of what has been discussed in the rubrics of post-modernism, re-enchantment, and desecularization as an array of opposing tendencies, themes and forces. As more roles were given to local governments, *adat* became a vehicle for peoples' voices against state control as well as a tool of ethno politics. This has strengthened communal bonds and ethnic identities in many cases, and that gave rise to xenophobia which led to violence against migrants from other provinces. There was also the emergence of local elites who became *raja kecil* (small kings) that gave rise



to decentralized 'corruption'. As movements of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) spread worldwide, *adat* gained a new practical position as well (Takano, 2008). However, due to the prior weakening of *adat* as a result of urbanization and modernization, people are in fact no longer familiar with them, and the originality of *adat* are questionable, and their aims are not easy to understand. Takano (2008) notes further that *adat* lack specific methods for conflict resolution, and therefore at the district court level *adat* is considered "not to be here". Moreover, the vocabularies of *adat* such as *musyawarah-mufakat* are quite often mixed up with the new words 'win-win solution' to meet the needs of foreign investors and the capitalist interests.

On the other hand, the end of Suharto's regime cleared the way for desecularization forces to happen. It marked the emergence of so-called transnational Islam in Indonesia, whence there began (1) increasing awareness of global Islamic issues among Indonesian Muslims, and (2) their participation in global Muslim discourses and activities centered on jihad and *Shariah* law. Islamists believe that such movement could neutralize the diversity of *adat*. In this sense, the *adat*-revival appears as a 'secular complement to Islam [revival]', as Headley (2008:4) puts it. The former revives without any ultimate cosmological reference, whereas the latter calls to return to the Quran and Sunna. Davidson and Henley (2007) present four factors to explain the nature and causes of *adat* revival:

- a. Support from international organizations
- b. Oppression of the New Order regime
- c. Opportunity of *reformasi* (the fall of New Order)
- d. The enduring role of *adat* in the political imagination of nationalism.

Meanwhile, Tania Li (2007) claims that both on a local and national level, appeal to *adat* tends to privilege elites, “especially senior men, who are empowered to speak on behalf of a presumed whole” (p.366). The works of Li, Davidson and Henley on *adat* issues brought to mind the links between ethnic rights and ethnic cleansing in the *Blut* and *Boden*<sup>16</sup> of the Nazi. On a different note, Headley (2008) highlights a thesis that holds it was Islam, that has created ‘civility’ in Indonesia and historically provided the most “effective bridge between local cultures” (p.31).

For if one is looking to create *civility*, “in the Enlightenment sense of toleration and restraint with respect to differences in culture, opinion and faith”, then it is possible to claim that Islam “plays a kind of civilizing role in Indonesian political life” (Headley, 2008:5).

Davidson and Henley (2007:32) also note that the current *adat* revival is “not coincidentally concentrated either in areas where Islamic conversion is blocked by Christianity or Hinduism, or in areas where Islamic conversion has taken place but pre-Islamic elements remain unusually important in social life”.

## **2. Patronage and Corruption**

While there are positive changes that have occurred in Indonesia since the fall of Suharto, Aspinall (2010) and Blunt *et al* (2012) show that contemporary Indonesia remains a patronage society and patronage remains systemic within the government. Clientelistic practices (jobs or other favours in the bureaucracy in exchange for support

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<sup>16</sup> A slogan expressing the nineteenth-century German idealization of a racially defined national body (“blood”) united with a settlement area (“soil”) that led to racist ethnic cleansing.

at election time) are how elites exercise their influence. In more recent work, Aspinall (2013) contends that clientelistic relationships between politicians and their network of supporters is a fundamental ordering principal of the contemporary Indonesian state. Notably, money politics and corrupt practices continue to constitute and sustain patronage, as Blunt *et al* (2012) illustrates:

Suppose for a moment that you worked in an organisation where positions were bought and sold and where price was dependent on how well you knew the boss, the opportunities the position and organisation afforded for illicit gain and how much new 'business' and how many new contacts you could bring to the network that you were paying to join. Suppose further that, like others who had purchased their jobs, you had borrowed money from your extended family or from friends to pay in advance the going price—of about three times your annual salary—and that your (official) salary by itself was barely enough to cover the basic necessities of life. In Indonesia, these are typical conditions of patronage—in which state assets are treated as if they were the private property of elected or administrative officials or patrons, who are largely unaccountable and rule with the help of networks of clients that are paid off for their support (Dwiyanto *et al.*, 2003; Kristiansen and Ramli, 2006; World Bank, 2000)... The poor are generally considered to be most disadvantaged under these conditions (e.g. Diminio, 2009). This logic has made the containment of corruption a central feature of development assistance rhetoric (e.g. Doig, 2006). (p.64)

According to Blunt *et al* (2012) Indonesia is an interesting case of patronage,

“because its development has entailed such long and close collaboration with market-oriented agencies, like the

World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development, and because it has been portrayed in the media and in the donor literature as a model of democratic development (Kristiansen and Santoso, 2006)" (p.65).

Yet, in Indonesia and elsewhere, the neo-liberal 'promise' has been that macro-economic and governance reform are sufficient to eliminate patronage, rent seeking and other bad practices and that steady progress is being made (Blunt *et al*, 2012). It is worth noting the following:

For Indonesia's government, and for other governments with which it has close ties, the economic and governance indicators are sufficient to justify describing Indonesia as a 'democratic success story'... Carothers (2011) has even described Indonesia as a 'role model for post-Mubarak Egypt' (Blunt *et al*, 2012:65)

Contrary to that optimism, my dissertation outlined a number of critical theorists in development studies (Alkatiri, 2016a) who argue about the destruction of local economies by global capitalism and the widening inequality gaps in places like Indonesia (e.g. see The Guardian, 2017). Coalitions of government and business interests have managed to retain their control of the state apparatus and to put it to their own use for personal gains (e.g. Klinken, 2009; Luebke, 2009). Blunt *et al*, (2012) review a series of studies conducted over the last 10 years that confirm this and present some corroborating data in the study during 2011, which makes a contrast to the statements of government officials and scholars above-mentioned. Reinforcing the view of some scholars that the Third World development is merely a continual colonialism, Blunt *et al* (2012) notes:

we present empirical evidence to suggest that, whether by design or by default, development assistance

has contributed to the spread and consolidation of patronage—by providing resources for predation (confirming earlier findings by, for example, World Bank, 2000), by not knowing how to address questions of patronage or by simply turning a blind eye to it. We are not alone in thinking this (p.65)

In addition, development assistance has been criticised by many for not giving sufficient attention in practice to the political mediation of state–society interactions, including patronage (Blunt *et al*, 2012:66). *Proyek* (Indonesian word for project, denoting development projects) as a source of patronage is widely accepted as it continues to characterize Indonesian politics (Aspinall, 2013). Additionally, Blunt demonstrates that where ever patronage is systemic, standard technocratic forms of governance reform alone are not likely to succeed, and are relatively easily deflected or reconstituted by patronage networks. Notably, in the New Order's centralised control and network of patronage, corruption was regulated by the centralised structure and took place mostly at high level. However, the demise of Suharto with the dramatic political turmoil that followed did not end the old patronage system and corruption, and for the worse, corruption in the contemporary decentralization era has become more decentralised and less predictable (Nguitragool, 2011).

### **Resource Nationalism**

Indonesia is increasingly described as a country where 'resource nationalism' is on the rise (Warburton, 2014). Law 4/2009 on Mineral and Coal Mining (the 2009 Mining Law) is the most widely referenced example of Indonesia's rising resource nationalism. The natural resource sectors have largely steered Indonesia's economic

growth over the past decade. Mining contributes 12 per cent of Indonesia's GDP. But large multinational companies dominate the sector, particularly American based companies such as Freeport McMoRan and Newmont. Freeport is the country's largest copper producer by far, with 73 per cent of the market share and gross profits of 1.53 billion US\$ in 2013 (Warburton, 2014). Since 2009 an assertive Indonesian government has begun introducing new laws and regulations that attempt to capture a larger share of these industry profits.

People use the term 'resource nationalism' in different ways. Industry commentators, journalists and some scholars typically deploy it to criticize government attempts to assert greater control over resource sectors at the expense of foreign investors. At best, such analysts frame resource nationalism as short-sighted, poor policy-making; at worst they see it as the work of corrupt, rent-seeking government elites. The proponents, in contrast, frame nationalist practices as a means of giving citizens a larger stake in their own finite resources, and achieving a more just system of rent distribution. Yet, while patronage remains systemic and wherein the clientelistic relationship between politicians and their network of supporters prevails, it is impossible to depend upon the spirit of redistribution, for there will be vested business interests and patronage relations among Indonesian legislators, besides the structural power and influence of the country's massive foreign mining companies.

### **3. Fragmentation**

Aspinall's work (2013:30) shows that Indonesia's contemporary society and political life are characterised by pervasive fragmentation which he argues is associated with

neoliberalism. The question, then, refers to the ways patronage distribution and neoliberalism encourage fragmentation. At the most general level, the key link between patronage and fragmentation is that, where political connections are built not on the basis of ideological, identity, or like affinities, but on the basis of personalistic exchanges of political loyalty and material rewards, the possibilities for multiple patrons and clients to compete for individually beneficial political relationships are almost endless. A distinctive feature of Indonesian political life at present is its lack of powerful, permanent poles of attraction. Fragmentation is visible virtually everywhere. Almost every subset of civil society is characterized by atomization and there is myriad new or revived local identities based on ethnicity and region, with various forms of cultural revival, reinvigoration of customary institutions (*Adat*), proliferation of ethnic associations, and mobilization of local ethnic identities in virtually every region. Everywhere, Aspinall (2013) continues, identity patterns are becoming both more fragmented and more assertive. Many commentators have viewed such developments in a negative light, seeing them as a sign of parochial erosion of the sense of common citizenship required in a healthy polity.

In the Muslim societies, there is bewildering multiplication of Islamic movements (Aspinall, 2013:45-48). The growing influence of transnational-oriented Islamic movements has reduced the central importance of Muhammadiyah and NU in defining the moderate mainstream. In urban centers, where people are immersed in mobile and diverse social contexts, far removed from the closed social environment of the village, many are becoming:

“religious seekers” who might participate in a Hizbut Tahrir meeting one day, visit a celebrity preacher the next, and then download some fatwa from a favorite website the next morning before going on to participate in a particularly satisfying Sufi gathering. Religion is in other words coming to resemble an increasingly diverse marketplace inhabited by individual consumers, rather than being constituted by rigidly defined collective identities and their associated organizations into which a person is born and wedded until death. (Aspinall, 2013:46)

The latter suggests an urbanization-induced **process of ‘deinstitutionalization’ in a private sphere** discussed in Berger and Luckmann (1991) and reflected further in my theoretical framework (Alkatiri, 2014). In view of that, someone born in a traditionalist NU or reformist Muhammadiyah family can now choose to abandon their community traditions and join another ones (see findings in the fieldwork section of my dissertation (Alkatiri, 2016a)). In other words, the child of an NU family can join Hizbut Tahrir, as much as the child of Muhammdiyah can join the Sufi order.

## **Discussion**

A detailed and close examination has revealed the fact that Indonesia has been forced into a global economic order and developmentalism within which the participation of Muslim groups has been insignificant or even minuscule, and where Islamic values and philosophies hardly play a role at all. This fact must be taken into account in the study of religious conflict in Indonesia today.

This article demonstrates that social movements can emerge from, and be sustained by, Islamic education and learning communities. These types of social movement, in one



way or another, are associated with social interactions and conflicts, thus, a 'clash of symbolic universes' (see Alkatiri, 2014). Inequalities in wealth and power between Muslims and the secular groups only increased the tensions.

Referring to Berger and Luckmann's (1991) ongoing dialectical process of social construction of 'reality', the colonial history and the West's enduring domination and control over the Muslim world have developed a typification of the West as, either 'the Christian West', or 'the infidel (*kufir*)' in Muslims' mind, and the Muslims continue to use this typification to apprehend the West down to this day. The Muhammadiyah and NU's socio-historical background in this article can possibly be extrapolated into the Muslim world at large to explain the variegated Islamic movements and their contemporary ramifications.

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